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Thinking fast or slow? Functional magnetic
resonance imaging reveals stronger
connectivity when experienced neurologists
diagnose ambiguous cases
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Monicque M. Lorist,1,3 Henk G. Schmidt,4 André Aleman3 and Jos W. Snoek5,6
For 40 years, thinking about reasoning has been dominated by dual-process theories. This model, consisting of two distinct types
of human reasoning, one fast and effortless and the other slow and deliberate, has also been applied to medical diagnosis. Medical
experts are trained to diagnose patients based on their symptoms. When symptoms are prototypical for a certain diagnosis, practi-
tioners may rely on fast, recognition-based reasoning. However, if they are confronted with ambiguous clinical information slower,
analytical reasoning is required. To examine the neural underpinnings of these two hypothesized forms of reasoning, 16 highly
experienced clinical neurologists were asked to diagnose two types of medical cases, straightforward and ambiguous cases, while
functional magnetic resonance imaging was being recorded. Compared with reading control sentences, diagnosing cases resulted in
increased activation in brain areas typically found to be active during reasoning such as the caudate nucleus and frontal and par-
ietal cortical regions. In addition, we found vast increased activity in the cerebellum. Regarding the activation differences between
the two types of reasoning, no pronounced differences were observed in terms of regional activation. Notable differences were
observed, though, in functional connectivity: cases containing ambiguous information showed stronger connectivity between specif-
ic regions in the frontal, parietal and temporal cortex in addition to the cerebellum. Based on these results, we propose that the
higher demands in terms of controlled cognitive processing during analytical medical reasoning may be subserved by stronger com-
munication between key regions for detecting and resolving uncertainty.
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Introduction
The cognitive processes and underlying neural mecha-
nisms that shape reasoning are central to fast and accur-
ate decision-making. Medical diagnosis is a particularly
high stakes domain in which the accuracy of decision-
making is imperative. During medical problem solving,
experienced physicians are thought to rely primarily on
recognition-based reasoning, using the so-called ‘illness
scripts’ when diagnosing patients (Schmidt et al., 1990;
Schmidt and Rikers, 2007). These ‘illness scripts or sche-
mas’ involve the retrieval of diagnostic hypotheses upon
encountering typical symptoms of common diseases. For
common clinical cases, medical experts’ reasoning is
thought to be rapid, automated and heuristic (Type 1
processing). However, for less common cases, expert
physicians are able to override this default manner of
processing and revert to analytical processes (Type 2
processing) when encountering complex, ambiguous or
contradictory symptoms (Pelaccia et al., 2011). In these
situations, medical reasoning is more elaborate as indi-
cated by longer case response times, and better memory
for clinical case information (Mamede et al., 2010).
Numerous theories based on research in social cognition,
reasoning, judgement and decision-making exist that
make a clear distinction between fast, automatic and in-
tuitive reasoning (Type 1) and slow, effortful and
analytical reasoning (Type 2) (Evans, 2003, 2008; Evans
and Stanovich, 2013), the dual-process paradigm.
This distinction between these types of reasoning has
been a useful concept in behavioural psychology and
medical reasoning, but there is as of yet little empirical
insight into their neural underpinnings. To shed more
light on this, we conducted a functional MRI (fMRI)
study on the neural correlates of Type 1 and Type 2 rea-
soning in medical decision-making.
Diagnostic reasoning by both experts and novices (med-
ical students, junior doctors) is characterized by the same
processes of hypothesis generation and verification (Brush
et al., 2017). Early hypothesis generation is based on pat-
tern recognition, and the quality of this early hypothesis
(or limited number of hypotheses) depends on knowledge
gained through experience, which is highly personal.
Expertise depends on the ability to rapidly access this
highly personal body of knowledge, acquired in many
years of clinical practice. In unfamiliar, atypical or other-
wise complex cases, pattern recognition is insufficient and
experts will have to turn to analytical forms of reasoning,
using pathophysiological or conceptual knowledge.
Research on clinical reasoning has revealed that physi-
cians can be triggered into this more reflective mode of
reasoning (versus an automatic reasoning mode) when
encountering uncertainty when diagnosing clinical cases.
This reflective reasoning is exemplified by longer
Graphical Abstract
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processing times, but not reduced diagnostic accuracy, as
the increase in processing time warrants optimal diagnos-
tic reasoning (Norman et al., 2017).
Here, this study thus addresses the question: is it pos-
sible to describe differences in neural correlates of differ-
ent diagnostic strategies employed by experts in a
circumscript field of expertise? Unlike in other studies in
this field (Durning et al., 2015; Hruska et al., 2016), we
were not interested in possible differences between neural
correlates of reasoning strategies between medical experts
and novices, or in novices (medical students) (Chang
et al., 2016), instead we focused on different reasoning
strategies of medical experts themselves.
Medical reasoning is also a prototypical and relevant
domain to empirically investigate the neural correlates of
reasoning in a real-life setting. First, it is a high stakes
domain: wrong decisions in a medical setting can have
catastrophic consequences and important decisions often
have to be made under time pressure. Moreover, task
environments (e.g. evolution of symptoms and signs in a
deteriorating patient) are dynamic and timely decisions
must be made under the conditions of limited informa-
tion, which may result in uncertainty about diagnosis and
treatment.
On a neural level, dual processing in social cognition
has been suggested to involve two distinct neural circuits:
the reflexive system composed of the amygdala, basal
ganglia and lateral temporal cortex and the controlled
system involving the anterior cingulate cortex, the pre-
frontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe (Lieberman,
2000).
An alternative theory suggests that these two types of
reasoning are actually executions of similar rules at dif-
ferent levels of automation, inferring activation of the
same brain circuits and areas, even though the first cases
are diagnosed faster than the latter (Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer, 2011). The latter view is more in line with
the current body of literature on the cognitive and neural
underpinnings of brain functioning. The brain constantly
makes predictions about future situations with as func-
tion to minimize the amount of information to be proc-
essed, an activity which is called predictive encoding
(Feldman and Friston, 2010). In the case that unexpected
information is encountered, a prediction error occurs. In
terms of medical reasoning, this could occur when case
information is ambiguous. For instance, a patient might
present one or more symptoms that are more or less
prototypical for a particular diagnosis. This information
is processed, and the medical examiner comes up with a
provisional, tentative diagnosis—the emergence of an ill-
ness script. These illness scripts can be described as the
narrative of the daily manifestation of the underlying dis-
ease (Schmidt and Rikers, 2007). Incoming information
from the patient is then matched to the illness script. Put
differently, when the medical expert is given information
about a case, the expert sets up an internal model of
what other information can be expected and subsequent
information (either directly present or searched for) is
evaluated whether it strengthens (or even confirms) or
weakens (even rejects) this model.
To study these processes in the human brain, we col-
lected blood oxygen level-dependent imaging fMRI while
16 medical experts (licenced neurologists, >10 years of
experience) processed and diagnosed both straightforward
and ambiguous clinical cases (Fig. 1). This is in line with
the daily practice of diagnosing patients by clinicians.
Many patients in the setting of an outpatient clinic are
‘straightforward cases’: they present symptoms and signs
more or less consistent with a well-known clinical pat-
tern. Difficulties arise when symptoms or signs are atyp-
ical or absent when expected. In the dual-process
paradigm, straightforward cases induce ‘automatic’ re-
trieval of a diagnostic hypothesis (i.e. Type 1 processing),
while ambiguous cases require deliberate, reflective proc-
essing (i.e. Type 2 processing). For this study, carefully
designed neurology cases were presented to the participat-
ing neurologists in two distinct versions, in both versions
ultimately leading to the same final diagnosis. Clinical
cases were 10 sentences long (Mwords ¼ 69; range¼ 60–
82) and led to a single correct diagnosis. Type 2 cases
were constructed by removing one to three sentences of
Type 1 cases and replacing them with distracting patient
information (noise), irrelevant to or conflicting with an
early, provisional diagnosis, all information together ul-
timately leading to the same final diagnosis. The number
of words for each Type 1 and corresponding Type 2 case
was equal. The distorting information, intended to induce
a shift from Type 1 reasoning into Type 2 reasoning, al-
ways followed three to four lines with identical informa-
tion in the two conditions, which enabled participants to
make an early hypothesis, a preliminary, tentative diagno-
sis. Although one cannot be sure that this manipulation
results in an actual shift from Type 1 reasoning into
Type 2 reasoning, it is reasonable to suppose that this
occurs if accompanied by an increase in reaction times.
Participants in the fMRI study read and diagnosed 21
clinical cases (10 or 11 Type 1 cases, and 10 or 11 Type
2 cases) and read a baseline text to separate brain
Figure 1 Trial sequence for the medical cases.
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activation related to reading. After finishing each case,
they vocalized the diagnosis in the scanner. Afterwards,
participants provided confidence and difficulty ratings
outside the scanner.
Materials and Methods
The study had two phases. The first phase was a pilot
study to validate the two different case types. The pilot
study resulted in 21 cases that were used in the fMRI ex-
periment during the second phase.
Case validation pilot study
Participants
Seventeen native Dutch neurologists (recruited from the
non-academic hospitals neighbouring Rotterdam) partici-
pated in the case validation pilot study (one woman,
Mage ¼ 53 years, range ¼ 46–65 years). All participants
had at least 10 years of working experience as a licenced
neurologist (Myears ¼ 20, range ¼ 11–31 years) and prac-
ticed the full field of clinical neurology full time in a
non-academic hospital. This latter requirement was a de-
liberate choice, as most neurologists in academic hospitals
work as super specialists in a limited field, whereas in
this study we focused on reasoning processes of experi-
enced general neurologists, with broad expertise covering
the entire field of clinical neurology. In the Netherlands,
specialist training in neurology consists of 6-year under-
graduate medical training followed by a 6-year residency
phase. All neurologists volunteered to participate in this
study without remuneration (other than a bottle of wine
or a museum ticket).
Stimuli, task, experimental design
The task of the participants was to diagnose 26 neuro-
logical cases presented on a laptop in E-prime (version
2.0). These clinical cases were constructed by two experi-
enced neurologists, and each case had both Type 1 and
Type 2 versions. Cases were constructed following
defined requirements (broad coverage of the field of neur-
ology; natural sequence of clinical information; cases had
to be solvable with the information provided; approxi-
mately equal number of words). Each case consisted of
10 short sentences (mean number of words ¼ 69; range
¼ 60–82 words). Type 1 cases were more or less proto-
typical, where most items were exemplary for and a least
consistent with the correct final diagnosis. Type 2 cases
were adapted by replacing one to three sentences with
ambiguous patient information (noise) to elicit slow, ana-
lytical reasoning. In the Type 2 cases, a similar tentative
diagnosis was possible within the first three to four items
without the need of overt reasoning. To provoke analyt-
ical reasoning, usually the fourth and/or fifth sentences
contained noise information; sometimes an additional
noise item was added in the latter part of the text.
Depending on the cases, care was taken to assure that,
although atypical, the Type 2 cases were solvable using
the information provided (for two case examples and a
list of case diagnoses, see the Supplementary material).
Following a practice case, participants diagnosed, self-
paced, 26 cases, ensuring that there was a balanced dis-
tribution of Type 1 (13) and Type 2 (13) cases. Each
case can be considered as an individual trial and con-
sisted of the presentation of five lines of white text on a
black background at the upper half of the screen. After
participants had read the five lines of text, they pressed a
button and the remaining five sentences were provided
below the first five lines. When participants reached a
diagnosis, they pressed a button to type this diagnosis in
the next screen. They also indicated (on a scale from 0
to 100) how confident they were with their diagnosis,
how much effort it took them and how difficult the case
was.
Diagnostic accuracy (0¼ incorrect diagnosis, 1¼ partially
correct diagnosis, 2¼ correct diagnosis), case processing
time (s) and subjective measures of confidence, effort and
complexity were analysed across participants to allow for
case validation. Diagnostic accuracy was determined by
J.W.S. and an independent fellow neurologist. The
Spearman correlation between the raters’ scores was 0.82.
Through discussion, agreement was reached on all rating
disagreements. A unified rating of diagnostic accuracy was
obtained that was also used in the final fMRI experiment.
The following case selection criteria were applied to deter-
mine cases for the fMRI experiment: (i) mean diagnostic
accuracy >1 and (ii) processing time Type 2> Type 1.
Finally, confidence, effort and difficulty were analysed to
further validate the distinction between Type 1 and Type
2 cases and check that effort and difficulty were higher
for Type 2 cases than for Type 1 cases and confidence
was lower for Type 2 cases than for Type 1 cases. These
criteria led to the removal of five cases, leading to a total
of 21 cases to be used in the fMRI experiment. For these
21 cases, processing times during the pilot study were on
average 41% longer in the Type 2 version than in the
Type 1 version (see Table 1).
fMRI experiment
Participants
Seventeen native Dutch neurologists were recruited for
the fMRI experiment. Participants were recruited by an
advertisement on a national neurological conference and
via email lists. One participant was excluded because he
had a metal implant of unknown material after a frac-
tured chin, which made MRI scanning impossible.
Therefore, 16 neurologists participated in the final experi-
ment (four women; Mage ¼ 51 years, range 46–57 years).
All participants had at least 10 years of working experi-
ence as a licenced neurologist (Mage ¼ 18 years, range ¼
10–28 years) and practiced general neurology on a
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full-time basis in a non-academic hospital. The study was
conducted in according to protocols approved by the
Medical Ethical Committee of the University Medical
Center Groningen. Prior to the start of the experiment,
participants gave informed consent in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli, task and experimental
design
Each participant underwent an fMRI scan where two
runs were recorded, intermitted by an anatomical record-
ing. Participants were asked to diagnose 21 neurological
cases (Mword count¼ 69, range ¼ 60–82), selected through
the case validation pilot study. Participants each proc-
essed and verbally diagnosed 10 or 11 Type 1 cases, and
10 or 11 Type 2 cases (see Fig. 1 for an overview of the
trial sequence for a case to be diagnosed). Case distribu-
tion was counterbalanced across participants. Their diag-
nosis was transmitted by means of an in-bore
microphone and recorded using a digital dictaphone after
each case.
The experimental procedure was the same as the pilot
study, except that participants also read cloze probability
sentences belonging to a control condition (10 trials con-
sisting of 10 sentences each with seven or eight words),
which were randomly interspersed between cases. Cloze
probability sentences are lexically and semantically cor-
rect passive sentences (but the sentences did not form a
coherent story together). They were used as a reading
control condition as these sentences require minimal cog-
nitive processes (Kutas and Hillyard, 1984; Delong et al.,
2011). Finally, a screen showing only a red fixation cross
was presented 10 times, randomly intermixed between
the cases and reading trials, as a baseline condition (dur-
ation 15–25 s, timing randomly sampled from a uniform
distribution).
All stimuli were programmed and presented using E-
prime (version 2.0) and displayed using a Barco liquid
crystal display projector G300 (Barco, Kortrijk, Belgium)
on a translucent display at a resolution of 1024  768
pixels. The dimensions of the translucent display were
44 cm  34 cm. This subtends a visual angle of 32 
25.5 for the entire screen. Via a 45 tilted mirror, placed
on the top of the head coil, the participant was able to
see the entire presentation display. The distance from the
eyes to the screen (via the mirror) was 75 cm. After the
fMRI experiment was completed, the experimenter
brought the participant to another room and asked them
to rate the various cases using a 7-point scale on both
difficulty and confidence.
fMRI data acquisition
Scanning was performed using a 3.0-T MRI Scanner
(Philips, Best, The Netherlands) with a 32-channel SENSE
head coil. Functional recordings (echo planar images,
axial slices recorded in a descending manner) were made
using the following parameter settings: flip angle: 70;
echo time: 30 ms; repetition time: 2000 ms, field of view:
224 mm  136.5 mm  224 mm; 39 slices were acquired
in descending order (slice thickness of 3.5 mm, in-plane
resolution of 3.5 mm). Two sessions were recorded with
variable number of volumes since the task was semi-self-
paced (all sessions were completed within 15 min).
Between the two sessions, a high-resolution anatomical
scan was recorded. The anatomical T1 was made with
an in-plane resolution of 1 mm  1 mm, contained 160
slices and recorded transversal. Field of view was
232 mm  170 mm  256 mm.
fMRI data analysis
All analyses were performed in MATLAB (2015)
(MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). Magnetic resonance
images were analysed using SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Preprocessing consisted of slice time cor-
rection, realignment to correct for participants movement,
co-registration to align all functional data to the
Table 1 Mean (SD) case processing times, diagnostic accuracy, confidence, difficulty and effort ratings for the case
validation pilot study and the final fMRI study separated for Type 1 and Type 2 cases





Type 2 2 Type 1,





Type 2 2 Type 1,
t-value (df 5 15)
Case processing time (s) 39 (14) 55 (17) 2.88a 21.6 (6.2) 26.3 (9.0) 4.74b
Diagnostic accuracy 1.87 (0.12) 1.64 (0.12) 5.05b 1.81 (0.16) 1.61 (0.26) 2.72a
Confidence 80 (7) 69 (9) 4.70b 81 (11) 70 (14) 2.81a
Difficulty 32 (15) 46 (15) 2.30a 26 (12) 40 (15) 4.74b
Effort 32 (13) 45 (14) 2.51a NAc NAc NAc
Notes: The data for the case pilot validation study include five cases that were not selected for the final fMRI study. Diagnostic accuracy was scored as 0 (incorrect diagnosis), 1 (par-
tially correct diagnosis) or 2 (correct diagnosis). Confidence and difficulty were provided on a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all confident/difficult) to 7 (very confident/difficult) in
the fMRI experiment and transformed to a percentage for this table.
aDifference between Type 1 and Type 2 cases is significant at P < 0.05.
bDifference between Type 1 and Type 2 cases is significant at P < 0.001.
cNA: not available.
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participant’s anatomical T1, normalization to map all
images to Montreal Neurological Institute space and spa-
tial smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full
width at half maximum). The images for each functional
session were high-pass filtered at 0.008 Hz. Onsets of
both case types and cloze probability sentence were con-
sequently used as regressors for the first-level analysis to-
gether with the processing time (i.e. the moment the
participant pressed the button to continue or give the
diagnosis). We did not exclude cases from the fMRI ana-
lysis based on their accuracy, which could also be partly
accurate.
Additional preprocessing steps for the connectivity ana-
lysis including denoising regressors in the design that cor-
respond to white matter, CSF and mean global signal to
remove related variance, these signals were derived from
the subject’s anatomical image using segmentation in
SPM12. In the CONN toolbox region of interest (ROI)-
to-ROI analyses, time courses of each voxel in each ROI
are averaged to create an ROI-level time course and then
each ROI time course is correlated Fisher’s transformed
bivariate coefficient representing the functional connectiv-
ity between each region. The CONN toolbox extracts
five temporal components from the segmented CSF and
white matter, which were entered as confound regressors
in the task generalized linear model inside CONN (fol-
lowing the ‘default’ strategy implemented in the CONN
toolbox and followed by others) (Damme et al., 2019;
Deverdun et al., 2019).
Statistical analysis
At the participant level of the fMRI analysis, contrasts
were calculated for Type 1 cases versus baseline, Type 2
cases versus baseline and reasoning (Type 1 and Type 2
cases together) versus reading. At the second level of the
fMRI analysis, a t-test of each of these contrasts were
performed and reported at P< 0.05, corrected for family-
wise error rate (FWER). Figures were made using
BrainNet viewer (Xia et al., 2013). To give a broader
overview of potentially relevant brain areas, we also
included differences in activation between Type 1 and
Type 2 cases that reach a statistical threshold of
P< 0.005 at the uncorrected level.
Finally, functional connectivity analysis was performed
based on parcellated brain regions using the CONN tool-
box (version 18.b—https://web.conn-toolbox.org). The
CONN toolbox is based on the CompCor method and
performs an ROI-to-ROI condition-dependent correlation
of the timeseries derived from the residuals of the blood
oxygen level-dependent imaging timeseries (Fair et al.,
2007; Whitfield-Gabrieli and Nieto-Castanon, 2012). The
ROI parcellation in Conn is based on the Harvard–
Oxford atlas areas and resulted in 132 predefined ROIs.
A second-level test on functional connectivity between
parcellated brain regions was performed for the contrast
of Type 2 versus Type 1 cases. Connections were
reported using P< 0.05, corrected for false discovery
rate.
For both the case validation pilot study and the fMRI
experiment, the mean case processing time, diagnostic ac-
curacy and the various ratings [confidence, difficulty and
effort (only for the case validation pilot study)] were
compared between Type 1 cases and Type 2 cases using
a paired two sample t-test and considered statistically sig-
nificant for P< 0.05.
Data availability
The behavioural data from the pilot study and fMRI
study are available through the first author (berry.van.
den.berg@rug.nl). The fMRI data are available through
the University Medical Center (j.b.c.marsman@umcg.nl).
Results
Behavioural results
Significant differences in case processing time (mean reac-
tion timeType 1 < mean reaction timeType 2, see Table 1
and Fig. 2), diagnostic accuracy and subjective difficulty
ratings between the Type 1 and Type 2 cases were found,
indicating typical behavioural differences between both
forms of reasoning. Case processing times were on aver-
age 18% shorter for the Type 1 version than for the
Type 2 version. Importantly, the processing time of the
Figure 2 Behavioural results. Bar graphs represent the
difference between the response time of diagnosing cases (Type 1
and Type 2) and reading cloze probability sentences. Error bar
reflects mean 6 SEM.
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Type 1 cases was not significantly different to the reading
time of the reading of cloze probability sentences [t(15)
¼ 0.45, P¼ n.s.], but Type 2 cases were processed slower
compared with reading [t(15) ¼ 3.48, P¼ 0.0033]. Even
though experts took less time to process clinical cases
while in the scanner compared with the pilot group out-
side the scanner, their performance in diagnostic accuracy
and ratings on difficulty or confidence were similar in
both Type 1 and Type 2 cases.
fMRI results
Our first analysis focused on the difference between read-
ing cloze probability sentences and diagnosing cases to
check whether the reasoning conditions (Type 1 and
Type 2 cases combined) resulted in the activation of
brain areas generally associated with reasoning (Table 2
and Fig. 3). Notably, this contrast revealed several brain
areas with increases in blood oxygen level-dependent
imaging signal. In particular, this pertained activation of
the left frontal and left parietal regions, caudate nucleus,
superior frontal gyrus and cerebellum.
Our next analysis focused on testing the hypothesis
that differential areas would be involved when processing
Type 1 versus Type 2 cases. We found no observable dif-
ference in the magnitude of the blood oxygen level-de-
pendent imaging response between these two different
types of cases. Lowering the significance threshold
(P< 0.005 uncorrected) revealed several areas with trend-
level differential activity between the different case types
(Table 3). Notably, for Type 1>Type 2, these areas
were slightly anterior to left cingulate gyrus, supplemen-
tary motor area and slightly anterior to right cingulate
gyrus. For Type 2>Type 1, these areas included the
right putamen, slightly inferior to right anterior cingulate,
slightly inferior to left anterior cingulate and various
regions in the (orbito) frontal cortex. Given the lack of
significance at FWE-corrected level (P< 0.05) activity, dif-
ferences should be interpreted with caution.
Connectivity results for reasoning versus reading
showed various connections that differed between both
conditions. Most prominent locations for reasoning were
regions residing in bilateral temporal gyrus and frontal
gyrus. For reading, these included regions in the frontal
and motor cortex (Fig. 4A).
Finally, we investigated connectivity differences in brain
activity during the diagnoses of Type 1 and Type 2 cases
(Fig. 4B). We found two connections stronger for Type 1
compared with Type 2: right posterior superior temporal
gyrus with right anterior inferior temporal gyrus and left
medial visual regions with left precentral gyrus (see also
Table 4). For Type 2 cases, we found stronger connec-
tions between inferior temporal gyrus and middle tem-
poral gyrus, superior temporal gyrus and frontoparietal
regions, i.e. posterior parietal cortex, vermis in the cere-
bellum and middle temporal gyrus (Fig. 4 and Table 4).
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to examine neural
underpinnings of reasoning in expert medical reasoning.
To do so, in this study, expert general neurologists
(>10 years of experience) diagnosed patient cases while
concurrently brain activity was being recorded (fMRI).
We focused on the reasoning processes underlying two
types of medical cases: one type that induced diagnostic
uncertainty (Type 2 cases) and compared neural activa-
tion and functional connectivity during reasoning to those
cases that were relatively straightforward (Type 1 cases).
Figure 3 Blood oxygen level-dependent imaging activity
differences. (A) Reasoning (Type 1 cases and Type 2 cases
together) showed activity in caudate nucleus, left prefrontal,
parietal and cerebellar regions. (B) Activity difference map between
Type 1 and Type 2 cases. No significant difference was found at
P< 0.05 (FWE corrected).
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Our study is novel in that we presented cases that, in all
likelihood, induced a shift in reasoning strategy without
instructing the participants to do so. Although the highly
artificial study situation inside an fMRI scanner of course
differs extremely from the real clinical situation in an
outpatient clinic, the mix of common and uncommon
clinical cases is natural to the clinician, who sees many
typical and untypical patients every week. In this respect,
our study differs from studies on cerebral activation dur-
ing the solving of clinical multiple-choice questions
(Durning et al., 2015; Chang et al., 2016; Hruska et al.,
2016). Our study also differs from these studies in that
our participants were all experts in their field, experi-
enced neurologists, who served as their own controls.
The neural correlates of the reasoning of experienced
neurologists were comparable to results from other
studies in participants with other backgrounds.
Specifically, during reasoning (versus reading cloze prob-
ability sentences), neurologists showed greater activity in
the caudate, left frontal and parietal brain regions. These
areas have been shown in previous studies to be active
during reasoning and medical reasoning (versus control)
(Rodriguez-Moreno and Hirsch, 2009; Chang et al.,
2016; Hruska et al., 2016). Combined with our results,
this suggests that the specific diagnostic processes and
brain areas used by neurologists during medical reasoning
resemble those found during other types of reasoning
(e.g. deductive reasoning). Perhaps surprisingly, we found
a large ensemble of cerebellar areas active during reason-
ing compared with reading. The cerebellum has long
been known to be involved in motor control and is
thought to serve a major role in working memory,
Table 2 Brain regions where significant differential activity was found between reasoning (both Type 1 and Type 2
cases) and reading
Contrast Region Peak voxel coordinates (x, y, z in MNI space) t-Value Cluster size (n voxels)
Reasoning > reading Cerebellum 4 78 32 16.94 5487
Left inf. and sup. frontal 48 6 30 13.98 1000
Left thalamus 8 8 4 11.72 136
Brainstem 4 34 22 11.71 425
Right caudate 16 6 22 10.82 208
Left hippocampus 36 24 8 10.45 20
Left parietal cortex 34 76 38 10.30 243
Left frontal cortex 10 38 42 10.10 48
Right thalamus 14 6 0 8.74 42
Left insula 30 22 4 8.55 29
Reading > reasoning Right parietal lobule 68 42 30 13.20 137
Right insula 389 12 2 8.41 13
Right anterior insula 40 4 4 7.69 13
Only cluster size >10 and P< 0.05 (FWER corrected) are reported.
FWER: family-wise error rate; MNI: Montreal Neurological Institute.
Table 3 Brain regions where differential activity (P< 0.005, not FWE corrected) was found between Type 1 and
Type 2
Contrast Region Peak voxel coordinates (x, y, z in MNI space) t-Value Cluster size (n voxels)
Type 1 > Type 2 Anterior to left cingulate gyrus 20 44 22 4.71 54
Supp. motor area 8 8 56 4.50 144
Anterior to right cingulate gyrus 4 32 20 4.13 16
Right primary motor cortex 18 26 64 3.56 28
Right temporal cortex 46 34 10 3.55 16
Cerebellum 16 48 28 3.48 13
Right insula 40 10 8 3.43 11
Left parietal 30 54 28 3.37 16
Right dorsal posterior cingulate 18 52 36 3.26 10
Type 2 > Type 1 Right putamen 24 0 8 5.57 140
Inferior to left anterior cingulate 12 22 18 4.48 47
Inferior to right anterior cingulate 8 16 22 3.60 26
Left frontal cortex 38 2 40 3.58 34
Left frontal cortex 22 14 50 3.50 74
Right orbitofrontal cortex 36 40 0 3.46 18
Left frontal cortex 58 20 22 3.32 36
Left orbitofrontal cortex 46 36 10 3.28 15
Only cluster size >10 and P< 0.005 (uncorrected) are reported.
MNI: Montreal Neurological Institute.
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Figure 4 Connectivity differences. (A) Connections between regions which are significantly more involved reasoning compared with
reading. (B) Connections between regions significantly involved in diagnosing the different types of cases.
Table 4 Connectivity results for reasoning versus reading and Type 1 versus Type 2
Region 1 Region 2 t-Value P-uncorrected P (FDR < 0.05)
Reasoning > reading
Posterior superior temporal gyrus left Anterior parahippocampal gyrus, left 5.25 <0.0001 0.008
Posterior superior temporal gyrus left Anterior parahippocampal gyrus, right 3.67 0.0011 0.0312
Posterior superior temporal gyrus left Anterior medial temporal gyrus 4.62 0.0002 0.0137
Posterior superior temporal gyrus left Occipital right inferior temporal gyrus 4.34 0.0003 0.0159
Posterior superior temporal gyrus left Temporal pole left 3.86 0.0008 0.0312
Inferior frontal gyrus Occipital right medial temporal gyrus 4.76 0.0001 0.0206
Reading > reasoning
Rostral prefrontal cortex Precuneus 5.19 0.0001 0.009
Frontoparietal cortex Posterior superior temporal gyrus 4.37 0.0003 0.0446
Inferior frontal gyrus Parietal operculum 4.38 0.0003 0.0445
Type 1 > Type 2
Posterior superior temporal gyrus Anterior inferior temporal gyrus 4.41 0.0003 0.0416
Medial visual region Precentral gyrus left 4.32 0.0003 0.0499
Type 2 > Type 1
Inferior frontal gyrus right Pre-central gyrus right 5.38 <0.0001 0.0063
Right lateral parietal Vermis region 3 5.17 0.0001 0.0093
Left lateral parietal Vermis region 7 5.06 0.0001 0.0116
FDR: false discovery rate.
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cognitive control and executive functioning (Durisko and
Fiez, 2010; Schmahmann, 2019).
Regarding differences between the reasoning conditions:
on a behavioural level, participants responded slower and
rated Type 2 cases (as compared with Type 1) as more
difficult. Interestingly, Type 1 cases had similar process-
ing time as compared with reading cloze probability sen-
tences. From a conceptual level, the time spent on
diagnosing cases consists of both reading the textual sen-
tences and the diagnostic process. The observation that
participants had slower processing time for Type 2 cases
(versus both reading and Type 1 cases) suggests that the
Type 2 cases did evoke additional thinking processes. On
a neural level, we did not observe strong regional activa-
tion differences of brain areas. Thus, there may be con-
siderable overlap in neural substrates subserving any kind
of diagnostic inference. Of note, we did find trend-level
differences in the magnitude of brain activation, in par-
ticular in posterior (greater for Type 1) and frontal
(greater for Type 2) regions. More specifically, the poster-
ior involvement might be related to response preparation
for straightforward cases and the frontal involvement
might be related to the processing of uncertainty for am-
biguous cases. Clearly, this needs further investigation, as
these results are tentative given the low statistical power.
The reasoning task used here was specifically designed
for a group of highly trained medical experts. On one
hand, this allowed for a high degree of ecological validity
regarding the reasoning processes evoked by the various
cases. On the other hand, a limitation of the study is
that the selection of this specialized group resulted in
relatively low statistical power due to the limited number
of participants and female participants that we could in-
clude. In addition, in the scanner, our group of experi-
enced neurologists responded much faster compared with
the neurologists in the case validation pilot study.
However, the relative difference in processing time be-
tween Type 1 and Type 2 (20%) was similar.
Connectivity results between the two types of cases
(Fig. 4B) did support the hypothesis of differential net-
work involvement in diagnostic processing of Type 1 and
Type 2 cases. More specifically, whereas Type 1 cases
evoked stronger connectivity within the temporal lobe
and between occipital and parietal areas, Type 2 cases
evoked stronger connectivity between frontal, temporal
and parietal areas in addition to a connection between
posterior parietal cortex and the cerebellum. The tem-
poral and parietal regions may be part of networks sub-
serving memory and attention, respectively, which are
relevant for both types of processing, albeit in different
ways.
On the other hand, Type 2 cases clearly involved stron-
ger connectivity for brain regions that have been identi-
fied as key nodes in brain networks for executive
functioning. This may involve cognitive effort and conflict
processing (Kutas and Federmeier, 2011; Kalisch and
Gerlicher, 2014). Of note, the cerebellum has been shown
to be involved in cognitive functioning (Schmahmann
et al., 2019), including executive functions such as cogni-
tive control. Interestingly, a recent study found involve-
ment of connectivity of cerebellum and parietal cortex
during repeated behavioural information uptake inform-
ing about personality traits of different persons (Van
Overwalle et al., 2017), which could be considered to be
similar to processing diagnostic information about
patients.
On a conceptual level, during the collection of informa-
tion about a clinical case, one or more hypotheses or
predictions about the most likely—but as yet provision-
al—diagnosis are constructed early in the diagnostic pro-
cess, based on the information that has been received
thus far (Schmidt and Rikers, 2007). If the next encoun-
tered information is in conflict or does not support the
current hypothesis, this conflict is detected and the initial
hypothesis has to be revised and updated based on the
new information. As such, we interpret the role of pre-
frontal areas as key in the detection of ambiguous infor-
mation (Mohr et al., 2015), which may extend to the
process of generating a provisional diagnosis. The main
difference in neural activity between Type 1 and Type 2
cases was found to concern increased connectivity be-
tween the frontal and parietal cortex, anterior and poster-
ior temporal cortex and parietal–cerebellum connection.
This connectivity finding fits well into a wider body of
literature regarding the detection, processing and reso-
lution of uncertainty (Yoshida and Ishii, 2006; Go~ni
et al., 2011; FeldmanHall et al., 2019). The lateral pre-
frontal cortex has been shown to be active in redecision
processing (revisiting one’s initial decisions) and to be
scaled with decision uncertainty reduction and correlated
with individual accuracy changes in a rule-based decision-
making task (Qiu et al., 2018).
Based on the connectivity differences between Type 1
and Type 2 cases, we propose that the main difference
in neural mechanisms between the reasoning strategies
during solving these distinct types of cases is the regula-
tion of information flow. We speculate that following
the detection of ambiguity in Type 2 cases, the areas
that are key in executive functioning (e.g. lateral pre-
frontal cortex) regulate attentional control and the types
of (ambiguous) information that are important to attend
to. We propose that subsequent differential communica-
tion between the frontal, parietal and temporal regions
(important for memory retrieval of expert knowledge)
that are involved in more fundamental cognitive mecha-
nisms gives rise to the overarching differences in reason-
ing processes.
We propose a more integrative dynamic view of med-
ical reasoning. Instead of grounding this view into cat-
egorically different types of reasoning (i.e. dual
processes), a better description can be based on the (old,
but not obsolete) information-processing psychology
concept of ‘schematic anticipation’ as described by Otto
Selz in the early 20th century (de Groot, 1965), and the
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more recent neuroscience predictive encoding theories.
According to Selz, when setting a concrete goal (i.e.
establishing a correct diagnosis), a ‘schematic anticipa-
tion’ of the consequence(s) of reaching this goal is al-
ways implied. This schematic anticipation of the
solution is the starting point for further reasoning proc-
esses. The ease and speed of these reasoning processes
are determined by the force (completeness) of the miss-
ing data necessary to close the gap between the antici-
pated and final solution.
Future research should investigate the possible underly-
ing neural mechanisms in more detail. For example, a
modern neuroscience counterpart of the concept of sche-
matic anticipation is the neural predictive encoding theory
(Friston, 2010, 2018; Clark, 2013), where a hypothesis is
generated by the brain that may need to be adapted in
the face of new information.
In summary, in this study, we found that the differen-
ces between processing straightforward (Type 1) and am-
biguous (Type 2) cases were processing time, diagnostic
accuracy and neural connectivity between areas that may
subserve a higher degree of controlled cognitive process-
ing (i.e. executive functions). The differences between
Type 2 and Type 1 may not primarily lie in discrete acti-
vation levels of isolated brain regions, but rather in the
communication or connectivity between key nodes in rele-
vant networks. These may underlie the detection of un-
certainty, generation of hypotheses and subsequent
revisions of a provisional diagnosis. In clinical settings,
this means that the clinician anticipates a final diagnosis
by first creating an early provisional diagnosis. When
subsequent case information is inconsistent or inconclu-
sive with this provisional diagnosis, the brain engages in
more elaborate controlled processing to compare and in-
tegrate externally presented information to knowledge
from memory. Thus, in our opinion, a cornerstone of ex-
pert reasoning lies in enhanced neural communication,
necessary to dynamically revise a provisional diagnosis
during the collection of ambiguous, and possibly conflict-
ing clinical information.
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Communications online.
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